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Abstract
This paper reviews literature dealing with the issue of detecting interviewers who
falsify survey data. The most reliable method of detecting falsiers is through
face-to-face reinterviewing of survey participants. However, only a limited num-
ber of participants can usually be reinterviewed. A review of the present lit-
erature clearly indicates that reinterviewing is more eective if the reinterview
sample is put together according to some indicators that might be based on
metadata, survey data or interviewer characteristics. We examine existing lit-
erature with regard to the suitability of dierent types of indicators that have
been used in this context.
JEL: C83 C93
Keywords: Interviewer falsi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1 Introduction
In economic and social research, survey data is often the cornerstone of empirical
investigations. Several factors that may impair the quality of such data during
the collection stage, such as systematic non-response or interviewer eects on
response behaviour, have gained attention in literature. Another important fac-
tor that has not received much attention thus far is the conscious deviation from
prescribed procedures by the interviewer, which is referred to as interviewer fal-
sication (Schreiner et al. 1988) or cheating (Schrapler and Wagner 2003). In
relation to this the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AA-
POR) denes \intentional departure from the designed interviewer guidelines
and instructions, unreported by the interviewer, which could result in the con-
tamination of data" as \interviewers' falsications"(AAPOR 2003: 1). There
is a wide range of potential forms of cheating (cf. also Schrapler 2010). The
most blatant of these is undoubtedly the fabrication of entire interviews without
ever having contacted the target person. Another possibility is partial falsica-
tion, for example making the contact but only asking a portion of the questions
contained in the questionnaire and faking the remaining data (Harrisson 1947).
More subtle forms are listed by Case (1971). They include interviewing some-
one other than the intended person (for example another family member or a
neighbour), changing interview mode (for example conducting the interview by
telephone when a face-to-face interview is required), or changing the location
of the interview (for example conducting it on a street corner if at-home inter-
views are required). This article reviews literature dealing with detecting the
most blatant form of cheating, namely the partial or complete fabrication of
questionnaires by the interviewer.
Seen from the interviewer's perspective, there are several reasons why data
fabrication might be an attractive option. Interviewers do not usually have a
strong interest in delivering high-quality data, apart from the potentially satisfy-
ing feeling of having done a good job. Interviewers are not involved in planning
surveys or developing questionnaires and it is unlikely that interviewers are
trained in scientic research ethics (AAPOR 2003). Furthermore, interviewers
are not involved in processing data subsequent to data collection during the eld
work period. As Durant (1946: p. 290) puts it, \[o]ne day's interviewing, how-
ever well done, merely serves to lead on to the next day's interviewing". Thus,
the reward from doing good work might be very small, whereas the task itself
can sometimes be quite unpleasant. Interviewers are required to ask people who
they do not know to reveal personal information, which may trigger dismissive
reactions (cf. Crespi 1945; Stewart and Flowerman 1951; Kohne-Finster and
Gullner 2009). Additionally, interviewers are often faced with payment schemes
based largely on the number of completed interviews (Kennickell 2002), which
create pressure to augment \quantity" and neglect the \quality" of interviews,
and may nally promote conditions leading to data fabrication (cf. Bennett
1948; Sudman 1966).
So far very little research has been done on the consequences of data fabri-
cation for subsequent statistical analyses. This might be due in part to the fact
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that the severity of these consequences is obviously related to the prevalence of
data fabrication. This parameter can be estimated only roughly, as it is likely
that not all relevant cases can be detected. Studies reporting some estimates
(e.g Schreiner et al. 1988; Koch 1995; Krejsa et al. 1999; Schrapler and Wag-
ner 2005; Li et al. 2009) suggest that the proportion of fabricated interviews
rarely exceeds 5%. However, these studies refer only to large-scale surveys. In
smaller surveys, with only a handful of interviewers, one may observe much
larger proportions of fabricated interviews. Harrison and Krauss (2002) report
on a survey in which only two of ve interviewers delivered reliable data. Bredl
et al. (2008) mention a case in which the rst round of a survey conducted by
four interviewers consisted entirely of faked interviews.
Not only is the quantity of fabricated data an important determinant in this
context, but so is quality. If cheaters were able to reproduce \realistic" data,
there would hardly be a problem. According to several studies (Hippler 1979;
Reuband 1990; Schnell 1991; Schrapler and Wagner 2005), cheaters generally
do quite a good job of tting their data to marginal distributions found in
real data, but they struggle to reproduce more complex relationships like those
revealed by factor analysis or multivariate regression analysis. Consequently,
even a small proportion of fabricated interviews, say of around ve percent,
might have a severe impact on the results of multivariate statistical analysis as
shown by Schrapler and Wagner (2005). But this is not necessarily the case as
demonstrated by Schnell (1991). To the best of our knowledge, no study has
yet been published that investigates the impact of extremely high proportions
of faked interviews, comparable to those that have been observed in some small-
scale surveys. Considering that small scale surveys play an important role in
the social sciences this topic merits attention.
As interviewer data fabrication seems to be a non-negligible problem, one
must be concerned about how to detect fraudulent interviews. Although the
overall volume of literature on this issue is still modest, the variety of proposed
methods and indicators is quite considerable, which clearly calls for some com-
parison and evaluation of dierent approaches. This is the issue we would like to
address in this literature review. Based on our analysis we also try to formulate
some recommendations on how to proceed in order to detect fabricated data,
and we identify elds of research that need more attention in the future.
For our literature review we systematically searched dierent data bases for
the social and economic sciences. Thus, we analysed literature, published in
English and German. Of the literature found, the majority concerned methods
of detecting falsiers (most were journal articles, but conference proceedings
and working papers were also available). In our review, we considered articles
on methods of detection based on empirical data. Overall, our search results
show that up to now no extended research exists on the topic of falsications.
Nevertheless, we were able to nd interesting results with respect to detection
methods and to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the dierent meth-
ods.
We distinguish between two types of studies. On the one hand there are
articles dealing with detection methods applied during eld control procedures
4
in surveys in order to identify unknown falsiers. We refer to this type of study
as \ex-ante studies". On the other hand we discuss studies applying dierent
indicators to datasets with known cases of falsication. We label this type of
study \ex-post study". The aim of ex-post studies is to identify indicators that
dier for data collected honestly and data which has been falsied. In Section 2
we examine key studies for both types of approaches. Based on this examination,
Section 3 discusses dierent methods to detecting data fabrication. Here we
focus on the eectiveness and the generalisability of the respective method.
Section 4 summarizes the ndings of our literature review and formulates some
recommendations based on insights from the previous sections. Furthermore,
this section highlights elds in which more research is needed.
2 Overview of key studies
In this section, we characterise selected comprehensive studies dealing with the
detection of fabricated data. Table 1 provides an overview of these studies.
As mentioned above, we distinguish between ex-ante studies employing the re-
spective methods in order to detect falsiers and ex-post studies that tested
several indicators in datasets with known cases of data fabrication. The table
consists of the following information: the survey to which the respective study
refers, the proportion of fabricated interviews found in each of the studies, and
the methods used to detect falsiers. All ex-ante studies included in the table
used recontact procedures combined with other methods. With respect to the
proportion of fabricated interviews we provide two numbers for ex-ante studies:
the rst refers to the proportion of falsied interviews in a random recontact
sample, the second to the proportion obtained when recontact procedures were
combined with other methods. Within ex-ante and ex-post studies dierent data
analyses were conducted, using meta-data or collected survey data. Metadata,
also called para-data, are survey process data, such as contact outcomes, ob-
tained by interviewers or data produced during the interview (e.g. with the help
of time stamps). Other analyses of survey data include comparison of answers
to survey questions, response sets (or response behaviour), and the application
of Benford's Law.
Koch (1995)
Koch (1995) describes control procedures and their results in a survey of the
German population (ALLBUS, German General Social Survey, 1994). The ALL-
BUS is a biannual survey related to social issues which was rst conducted in
1985. The study by Koch was motivated by a discussion about falsied in-
terviews in the German press. This discussion revealed the impression that
data arising from face-to-face surveys are, as a rule, contaminated by falsiers.
To counter this impression Koch published the results of control procedures in
the ALLBUS 1994. In 1994 personal registers from registration oces started
being used in the survey as sample frame. The previous sample method was
random route (ADM-System, der Heyde and Loeer (1993)), in which inter-
viewers selected sample units within the two last stages of the selection process.
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Table 1: Selected studies dealing with the detection of data fabrication.
Share of
Authors Survey Fabricated Detection Methods
Interviews
Recontact Metadata Benford's Other
Law Analyses
Ex-ante studies
Koch (1995)
Large scale
survey;
German
population;
ALLBUS
random:
0:4%,
combined:
2:3%
X X
Hood,
Bushery
(1997)
Large scale
survey;
American
population;
NHIS
random:
0:2%,
combined:
3:6%
X X X
Krejsa et al.
(1999)
Large scale
survey; three
American
regions;
Census 2000
dress
rehearsal
random:
0:006%,
combined:
0:6%
X X
Turner et al.
(2002)
Large scale
survey;
Baltimore
population
49% of 451
interviews
contributed
by 6 falsiers
(net sample
1 200
interviews)
X X
Ex-post studies
Murphy et
al.(2004)
Large scale
survey;
American
population;
NSDUH
No
information X X
Schraepler
and Wagner
(2005)
Large scale
survey;
German
population;
GSEOP
Sample A:
0:6%;
Sample B:
1:5%
Sample C:
2%
X X
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In contrast to ADM-samples, selected persons in personal register samples were
known prior to data collection. Additionally, information about gender and age
of sampled persons was provided in the sample frame. Interviewers received
names and addresses of selected persons and should have interviewed exactly
these persons. Hence, in the ALLBUS 1994 it is possible to systematically check
for falsications by comparing the information on gender and age in the survey
data with the data from the registration oces. Overall, the control procedures
combined dierent steps:
 A portion of interviews (25%) was routinely controlled by the survey in-
stitute responsible for data collection using postcards { they obtained a
60% response rate. These controls found 15 cases which were conducted
incorrectly. Hence, these controls did not reveal considerable information
about problems with the data.
 In addition, all 3 505 interviews realised in the ALLBUS were controlled
by Koch, comparing gender and age of interviewed and selected persons.
 All cases with deviations detected by Koch (n = 196) were controlled by
a new contact (in person, by phone or by post). As a result, contact with
the interviewer could not be conrmed by sampled persons for 45 inter-
views. These interviews were declared to be complete falsications. In 51
other cases someone other than the selected person was interviewed. In
yet another 31 cases mistakes were found (these interviews are declared as
interviews, in which a part of interview was falsied). Fifty sampled per-
sons could not be reached through controls and for the remainder technical
problems leading to deviations were found.
Koch was able to eectively extend the routine control procedures used by
the data collection institute and he found a considerable number of cases with
deviations. For his analysis he used only information related to the gender and
age of target persons. In case of deviation recontact procedures were used. In
this way, 2:3% of all interviews realised in the ALLBUS were classied as data
falsications. Koch mentions that the detection method used in the ALLBUS
is restricted by the sample method used. Samples, which use one or more
selection stages, in which interviewers are involved (random route or samples
with address registers as sample frame), cannot eectively apply this method,
since the selected person is { as a rule { unknown prior to data collection.
Another restriction of this method is that age and gender provide insucient
information to eectively expose falsied interviews. In most cases gender is
easy to determine by the target person's rst name, and age could be estimated
by interviewers or asked in a short interview with the target person or with
other household members (even with neighbours). The use of age and gender
as information can allow only for the detection of signicant carelessness in
interviewers' work or other technical problems in the eld for example. Falsiers
who are more cautious may not be detected by the procedure described by
Koch. Thus, the level of 2:3% of detected falsications represents the lower
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boundary for very gross fabrications. Hence, Koch's work indicates that a more
focused recontact procedure is more eective than controls conducted by the
survey institute with a portion of interviewed persons who are selected without
deliberate considerations.
Hood and Bushery (1997)
A study by Hood and Bushery (1997) investigated the usefulness of several in-
dicators in order to create a focused reinterview sample that could be applied
to the US-National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). According to the authors
data fabrication occurs rarely in the NHIS. As a result, many reinterviews are
required to detect a falsier. In this context the authors emphasize the useful-
ness of a focused reinterview that concentrates on interviewers who seem to be
more likely than others to have fabricated data according to some indicators.
A basic idea by Hood and Bushery is that cheating interviewers try to \keep
it simple" (p. 820). Thus, they can be expected to label eligible households
as ineligible and choose answers that allow questions to be skipped, leading
to avoidance of subsequent optional parts of the questionnaire. For example,
a considerable number of questions was not asked in white households in the
NHIS. Consequently, a high proportion of white or ineligible households within
an interviewer's assignment may be a sign of data fabrication.
The basic idea behind the approach is to examine data in questionnaires
as well as some metadata (ineligible households) in order to identify interview-
ers who merit a closer look during the reinterview stage. However, it is clear
that a relatively high proportion of white or ineligible households in one inter-
viewer's assignments is not necessarily linked to dishonest behaviour, but rather
might also be due to the specic characteristics of the area were the interviews
were conducted. This is known as so-called spatial homogeneity (cluster related
design eect; Groves et al. (cf. 2004)), meaning in this case the homogeneity
of individuals living within a geographical area. To dierentiate between in-
terviewer eects and spatial homogeneity, Hood and Bushery considered the
dierences between actual proportions and those that could be expected based
on data from the 1990 census. If dierences for all variables exceeded a certain
threshold, the interviewer was agged as an outlier and was then checked using
focused reinterviews.
During the focused reinterview 3 falsiers were detected from the 83 in-
terviewers that were checked (3:6%). This \success rate" is clearly above the
0:2% achieved by random reinterview. Although the informative value of theses
numbers should not be overrated, as they rely on a small number of cases, they
do indicate that focused reinterviews deliver better results than purely random
reinterviews.
The general problem with this approach is that discriminating between ef-
fects caused by data fabrication and those caused by the particularities of an
interviewer's assignment is dicult. A reliable reference survey { like the 1990
census in the case of the Hood and Bushery study { is often simply not available.
Furthermore { and a point also made by Hood and Bushery (1997) { in contrast
to the study by Koch (1995) the approach considers interviewers and not inter-
viewed individuals. This may be problematic if an interviewer fabricates only
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a small part of his assignments. In this case, indicators based on all interviews
done by an interviewer might have only little discriminatory power.
Krejsa et al. (1999) employed a very similar approach. The authors used sev-
eral indicators based on metadata, such as the proportion of vacant households
or dates and times of conducted surveys, in order to dene outlier interviewers.
These interviewers were then checked during the course of focused reinterviews.
Whereas random reinterviews detected only one falsier out of 1 706 cases, fo-
cused reinterviews found 10 falsiers out of 1 737 cases.
Turner et al. (2002)
Turner et al. (2002) describe their painful experiences with falsications of a
large part of the sample in a Baltimore population survey. In contrast to na-
tional large scale surveys described above, this particular survey had two special
aspects: rstly, it was related to a quite sensitive topic (sexually transmitted
diseases) in which biological specimens were collected; secondly, it was a large
local survey. This survey diers from national surveys for the second reason,
since the latter does not need a large interview sta in a local area. It was par-
ticularly dicult for the data collection institute to recruit a sucient number
of interviewers in Baltimore. Turner et al. (2002) report that very low partici-
pation rates were obtained, and as a result additional interviewer trainings were
conducted and the data collection period was extended.
The research team found irregularities in the data delivered by the data col-
lection institute: 6 interviewers showed implausible success rates in conducting
interviews. In fact 54% to 85% of assigned households were successfully inter-
viewed by these interviewers, in contrast to other interviewers, who succeeded
only 31% of the time on average. All interviews submitted by these interviewers
were veried by telephone or face-to-face recontact. In addition, controls for
other interviewers were conducted. Here, the authors used metadata (cf. Table
1) to nd suspected cases and combined them with a reinterview for verica-
tion. As a result it was found that 49% of the 451 interviews submitted by six
suspected interviewers were falsications.
The authors compared falsied and non-falsied interviews to nd clues
which could be useful in detecting falsications. In particular, falsiers pro-
duced implausible data regarding the composition of households (most of the
households in falsied interviews included only one 18-45 year old adult) and
phone numbers of respondents were not provided for false interviews. Addi-
tionally, responses related to sexual behaviour were not plausible in falsied
data.
A procedure by Turner et al. (2002) is similar to that reported by Koch
(1995): research sta conducted controls independent of any controls conducted
by the data collection institute. In contrast to Koch (1995), who checked only
suspected cases, all interviews conducted by suspicious interviewers were con-
trolled by Turner et al. (2002), with a high hit ratio for fabricated interviews.
But in comparison to other studies, using the number of conducted interviews
as a kind of metadata is restricted by the specics of the survey. These specics
are associated with diculties in conducting a local population survey on a sen-
sitive topic. However, results show that local population surveys on sensitive
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topics are particularly prone to falsications, and that it would be more eective
to recontact all cases assigned to a dishonest interviewer. Perhaps Koch and
other authors (who obtained low or very modest numbers of falsied interviews)
would have been more \productive", if they had applied controls to all cases
assigned to a dishonest interviewer.
Murphy et al. (2004)
Murphy et al. (2004) analysed data produced by 3 known falsiers in the Amer-
ican National Drug Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). This large-
scale survey selects around 70 000 persons each year who are interviewed us-
ing computer-assisted interviewing (CAPI) and audio computer-assisted self-
interviewing (ACASI), in which the laptop is given over to the respondent. In
the case of the NSDUH, the laptop registered time stamps for each question and
each interview step in both modes. This allowed for the calculation of elapsed
time for each respective action.
Like Turner et al. (2002) Murphy et al. examined response patterns to
sensitive questions related to the lifetime use of cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana,
cocaine and heroin. The authors calculated the proportion of respondents per
interviewer who claimed to have already consumed the respective drug during
their lifetime. To account for spatial homogeneity the authors controlled for
demographic characteristics of the (alleged) respondents by examining shares
separately for men and women, younger and older respondents and Hispanics
and non-Hispanics. The resulting indicator performed extremely well in separat-
ing falsiers and honest interviewers. In both cases, all 3 falsiers were among
the top four interviewers, if interviewers were ranked according to their index
values. As in the study by Turner et al. (2002) it turned out that falsiers strug-
gle to adequately reproduce answers to very sensitive questions. Thus, if those
questions are available, they might serve as good indicator for constructing a
reinterview sample.
Murphy et al. employed metadata { namely time stamps { in order to
determine whether response times are dierent when falsiers fabricate data as
compared to situations in which the data is collected honestly. The NSDUH is
a very interesting application in this regard, as it consists of the CAPI and the
ACASI part. However, it turned out that clear patterns of dierences between
falsiers and honest interviewers did not emerge for either the CAPI part or
for the ACASI part. One falsier was generally much faster than the other
interviewers, but the other two falsiers were much slower.
Overall, the study suggests that responses to sensitive questions, rather than
lengths of dierent interview modules, are a more reliable indicator for detect-
ing cheating interviewers. When analysing these responses, it must be kept in
mind that emerging patterns may also be due to the allocation of interviewers
to certain areas. Considering this, it is important to somehow control for this
factor. In terms of the environment in which Hood and Bushery (1997) oper-
ated there was no reference study available to the authors, so they stratied
their indicators according to some of the respondent's characteristics. Such an
approach always bears the risk of omitting some decisive characteristics.
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Schrapler and Wagner (2005)
Schrapler and Wagner (2005) examined the data from the German long-term
panel study SOEP. In such panel studies fabrications are relatively rare since re-
spondents are interviewed every year and consistency checks across the dierent
waves immediately reveal fraudulent data. By means of two dierent ex-post
analyses Schrapler and Wagner (2005) examined only data from the rst waves
of dierent samples of the SOEP (Schupp and Wagner 2002).
The rst one was based on the so called Benford's Law (Benford 1938), which
we illustrate in more detail in Subsection 3.3. The idea behind this method is to
compare the distribution of the rst digit of all numbers in the (metric) answers
from the survey with the Benford distribution. If the numbers follow a specic
monotonic declining distribution, simply spoken that the proportion of 1's is
higher than the proportion of the 9's, one can assume that the data is Benford
distributed. Schrapler and Wagner (2005) calculated the deviation from the
Benford distribution by means of a chi-square value for every interviewer cluster
rather than for every single interview. As a result they showed that about half
of the known fakers could indeed be marked as cheaters through application of
this detection method.
Apart from this analysis Schrapler and Wagner (2005) created an interesting
approach by incorporating several variables in order to detect known fakers in
survey data. The authors called this the \variability method" because the idea
behind it is that cheaters show a lower variance of specic answers across all
their conducted interviews than accurate interviewers do. Schrapler and Wag-
ner (2005) attributed the reduction of variance to the proportions of missing
answers, of extreme answers in scale questions and of conspicuously consistent
answers across specic questions in the questionnaire. Based on the observed
variance of interviews Schrapler and Wagner (2005) calculated a plausibility
value for every interviewer in order to identify cheaters. If the plausibility was
too low an interviewer was considered to be a faker. In this way the authors
ranked interviewers with respect to their plausibility values and noticed that
almost all of the known cheaters appeared at the top of the ranking. Addition-
ally, they noted that their results were much better than those which are based
on Benford's Law. Thus, we can infer from the results that the \variability
method" is a more promising way to reveal falsiers than Benford's Law.
Resume
Now we would like to summarize the ndings of studies presented in this section.
For ex-ante studies Table 1 shows that recontact is the most important method
for detecting false data. The studies show that random (or unfocused) recon-
tacts enable detection of only an insignicant number of falsied interviews.
In all of these studies unfocused recontact procedures were then rened using
supplemental information. This information was helpful in identifying addi-
tional fabricated interviews. For focused recontacts or reinterviews information
about contact outcomes or the number of interviews carried out by one inter-
viewer, referred to as metadata, were used (Table 1). Other simple data analyses
(such as those for age and gender of interviewed persons or the proportion of
non-minorities interviewed by one interviewer) were helpful in conducting more
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focused recontacts or reinterviews. However, choosing one of these methods
for ex-ante studies (and their success in detecting falsications) was highly de-
pendent on the specic circumstances of the study. More concretely, sampling
procedures, the survey topic, and the sensitivity of questions are all associated
with the usability of a particular detection method. Ex-post data analyses seem
to be an eective method of identifying indicators in order to separate false and
real data. But more research should be done here to determine the success of
such methods, and it should be reiterated that appropriate methods are often
bounded to the specics of a survey (e.g. the sensitivity of questions asked or
the proportion of appropriate questions for the application of Benford's Law or
the \variability method"). With the help of selected studies presented in this
section we aim to show how several methods and combinations of these methods
have been used in ex-post and ex-ante studies.
In the next section we carefully examine the dierent methods and discuss
their usability. We also introduce interviewer characteristics as an additional
method. Once dishonest interviewers had been detected, dierent autors (Koch
1995; Turner et al. 2002) then analysed the extent to which interviewer charac-
teristics dier between honest and dishonest interviewers. However, interviewer
characteristics were not used as an identication method in these studies. Thus,
we disregarded interviewer characteristics in Section 2.
3 Overview of dierent approaches
As outlined in Section 2 existing literature suggests that the eectiveness of
recontact procedures can be increased if they are combined with other indicators.
In this chapter we rst examine literature related to recontact procedures and
subsequently discuss the suitability of other methods that could be applied to
create focused reinterview samples.
3.1 Recontact procedures
The most common method of detecting faked survey data is the recontact
method. Using this method respondents are recontacted in person, by mail
or by telephone after the initial interview in order to verify whether the initial
interview actually took place. Below we will focus on this recontact method and
the possible problems associated with it.
In spite of the fact that AAPOR (2003) suggests that face-to-face recontact is
the most eective method of detecting fraudulent data, the most common recon-
tact method used in surveys involves sending postcards to interviewed persons
with an appeal to them to reply. These postcards mainly ask respondents about
the time, date, and critical components or topics of the interview, as well as the
interviewer's behaviour. A statement about not being interviewed or implausible
time and date information may then be considered as indicators of falsications.
In general this method has some questionable factors as shown by Koch (1995)
and Hauck (1969). These factors include memory problems and the willingness
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of contacted persons to reply, and these are associated with a selectivity bias.
Hauck (1969) sent postcards to interviewed and non-interviewed respondents
and noticed rstly that only 50% of interviewed respondents returned the post-
cards. Secondly, he showed that there were race, age and education dierences
between persons who sent postcards back and those who did not. This im-
plies that cooperative persons who sent the postcards back did not constitute a
sample which makes reliable statements about interviewed persons in general.
Thirdly, Hauck (1969) found that fourteen out of 100 non-interviewed persons
actually stated that they had been interviewed. Thus, it is clear that memory
problems or interviewed target persons not sending back postcards decrease the
validity of control results obtained by postcards. In particular, with respect to
response rates, telephone and/or personal contacts, also referred to as reinter-
views, are more eective than contacts using postcards.
Telephone or personal reinterviews were already mentioned in an early work
by Case (1971). In market surveys he conducted controls with telephone reinter-
views and revealed that about 27% of the interviews in all the studies examined
were not conducted properly. Also, the U.S. Bureau of Census regularly checks
a randomly selected portion of interviewers (between 2% and 10%) by rein-
terviewing particular target persons (cf. Bushery et al. 1999). But regarding
response and memory problems the reinterview process is limited by sample
size and duration (Cantwell et al. 1992). A large number of reinterviews in-
creases costs and a high number of questions posed within a reinterview is a
strain for respondents, and consequently biases results. Reinterviews are also
limited by the elapsed time following the interview (a delayed survey for further
control purposes (reinterview) bears the risk of memory eects). Thus, what is
required is a reinterview sample which is large enough to generate signicant
results but is small enough to keep costs down.
As we have illustrated above (cf. Section 2), ex-ante studies by Hood and
Bushery (1997) and Krejsa et al. (1999) (see also Li et al. (2009)) show that
a small, and most of all a non-randomly selected, reinterview sample is more
eective in detecting cheating interviewers. Thus, we must infer from these
empirical ndings that \content based reinterviews" perform much better than
random reinterviews, and most notably better than sending out postcards. In
the following sections we would like to present the prevalent indicators used
for the optimal creation of a focused reinterview sample: usage of metadata,
Benford's Law and other statistical analyses of survey data, as well as interviewer
characteristics.
3.2 Metadata
As already outlined in Section 2, the notion \metadata" comprises dierent
types of information related to the process of data collection, rather than to
the collected data itself. Metadata-based indicators used to detect falsiers can
be divided into two groups: indicators based on interviewer's contact outcomes
and indicators based on interview processing, such as date and time stamps.
Contact outcomes refer to information related to how many participants re-
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fused the interview or how many participants were ineligible for some reason. As
outlined above, Turner et al. (2002) were able to detect a large number of fab-
ricated interviews by focusing recontact eorts on interviewers who had shown
a suspiciously high success rate, whereas Hood and Bushery (1997) employed
the ineligible unit rate as an indicator to put together their focused reinterview
sample. In this context it is recommended to control for the characteristics of
the area where an interviewer conducts his/her work, as demonstrated by Hood
and Bushery (1997). However, due to a lack of reference data this is often not
possible.
Date and time stamps can only be recorded if the interview is conducted
using a mode which relies on computer assistance. If these are available, they
can be used to examine interview length, or the number of interviews completed
within one day or within periods in which interviews were conducted. These
types of indicators are employed by Bushery et al. (1999), Krejsa et al. (1999)
and Murphy et al. (2004).
Given a very limited number of studies it has so far been quite dicult to
evaluate how well metadata can be used to detect cheating interviewers. Krejsa
et al. (1999) combined both types of metadata-based indicators, which delivered
quite promising results. The results of Turner et al. (2002) are quite promising
as well, although the results of Murphy et al. (2004) show less promise. In the
case of Turner et al. it should also be kept in mind that general success rates
were quite low, probably as a result of the high sensitivity of the questions asked
in the course of interviews. Consequently, high rates for falsiers were extremely
noticeable.
A large advantage of approaches relying on metadata analysis is that they
can be applied to a vast range of surveys. Whenever interviewers are prescribed
which persons or households they are to contact, then one can calculate indi-
cators related to contact outcomes. Whenever interviews are conducted with
computer assistance, there is the opportunity to record date and time stamps.
3.3 Benford's Law
The largest part of the scarce research regarding the usage of answer patterns
to detect fraudulent interviews is related to the usage of Benford's Law for the
analysis of metric survey data. With accurate survey data the distribution of
the rst digit of these metric answers usually follows the so called Benford's Law
(Benford 1938), a logarithmic (Newcomb 1881) and scale invariant distribution
(Hill 1995). Thus, the probability that the rst digit of the numbers is 1 is higher
than the probability that it is 9. In general, Benford's Law could be adapted
to data without a built-in maximum (Nigrini 1999) and to data which is not
composed of assigned numbers like zip codes or bank accounts. For example,
Nigrini (1996) and Todter (2007) have shown that business and nancial data in
particular follow this monotonic decreasing distribution. Below we present some
comprehensive studies which analysed survey data by means of Benford's Law,
and we attempt to illustrate whether the authors were successful in identifying
fraudulent data.
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In order to reveal faked survey data by means of Benford's Law one must
ensure that accurate survey data is actually Benford distributed and that faked
data is not. If we look at the literature concerning this topic we cannot assume
that this is always true. This was shown by Schrapler and Wagner (2003), who
made a more in-depth ex-post analysis concerning the raw survey data from
the German SOEP. The authors showed that the proportion of the rst and
second digits of real metric survey data is close to the Benford distribution
and that faked data is not. But these ndings should be interpreted carefully
since the authors also observed a high proportion of 0's and 5's in the accurate
survey data, perhaps due to a rounding eect. Therefore, one cannot infer that
real survey data is surely Benford distributed. Results from the faked SOEP
survey data are in turn not generalisable because of a very low number of cases
of fabricated interviews (27 cases for faked data vs. 894 cases for real data).
These results are similar to the ndings of Wang and Pedlow (2005), who also
observed a rounding eect in accurate survey data.
Hence, Schrapler and Wagner as well as Wang and Pedlow, tested some mod-
ications to the analysis in order to improve the detection of cheaters. Schrapler
and Wagner calculated a chi-square value for \interviewer clusters", meaning
that they pooled together all interviews by one interviewer into one cluster. But
the clusters with faked data were not precisely revealed. Again the reasons are
a very small number of cases and, most of all, the spatial homogeneity of some
clusters. The latter is due to the dependent distribution of interviewers and
areas in the SOEP. But even if the authors take this spatial homogeneity into
account by means of a linear regression on the chi-square value, faked and real
clusters cannot be clearly separated. By contrast { concerning the rst digit {
Wang and Pedlow calculated the distribution the data set actually follows, the
\all cases distribution" (cf. Swanson et al. (2003)). By using this distribution
instead of that of Benford's Law, it now became possible for the authors to iden-
tify cheating interviewers. Further modications to the usage of the digits, for
example regarding the digit 5 as 0, only led to satisfying results if the authors
used the \all cases distribution" as well.
Thus, we infer from the results of Wang and Pedlow and Schrapler and
Wagner that real survey data does not clearly follow Benford's Law and that one
must be aware of the occurrence of a rounding eect. And there is still a lack of
evidence that faked survey data is not Benford distributed, although Diekmann
(2007) made an interesting contribution to this topic. Diekmann inspected
the rst and second digits of unstandardised faked regression coecients and
noticed that they deviate from the Benford distribution concerning only the
second digit. But one should notice that this has only been documented for
regression coecients and not for raw survey data. Additionally Diekmann
(2010) pointed out that one must avoid stating that survey data which deviate
from Benford's Law are automatically falsied. It often occurs that the whole
data set follows Benford's Law while some subsamples do not, even if they have
not been falsied. The authors supposed that the reason behind this is that
the numbers available for the analysis depend on the types of questions and
topics in questionnaires. If one disregards this dependent structure, the rate of
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\false positives" increases signicantly, and therefore the discriminatory power
of Benford's Law becomes too low.
To summarize, the current work concerning Benford's Law questions the
validity of this method. There is little empirical evidence that real survey data
are close to the Benford distribution and problems like rounding eects may
lead to a deviation from the Benford distribution. Also, it has not been clearly
shown that faked raw survey data are not Benford distributed, since the number
of cases is too low in most analyses. Thus, further modications to Benford's
Law, such as several combinations of digits, should be developed and tested in
datasets with a higher proportion of falsications.
Additionally, there is a lack of research regarding the number of interviewers
and the number of interviews per interviewer which are required for the iden-
tication of falsications to produce precise results. Recent work by Stornger
and Winker (2011), in which Benford's Law is used as one of four indicators,
suggests that the performance somewhat worsens as the number of interviews
per interviewer decreases and improves as the overall number of interviewers
decreases. However more research is needed to asses how many questionnaires
per interviewer are needed in order to successfully adopt Benford's Law. Also,
the number and types of variables in the questionnaire which are suitable for
application to Benford's Law have not been precisely identied (cf. Porras and
English 2004). Is Benford's Law only appropriate for metric variables in raw
survey data, or only for statistical estimates like regression coecients? As
Scott and Fasli (2001) demonstrated in a synthetic way, data are more likely
to conform to Benford's Law if the dataset contains only positive numbers and
is positively skewed with a modal value not equal to zero. But there is still a
lack of evidence for real survey data which t to the Benford distribution. So
far Benford's Law can be used to evaluate survey data quality (cf. Judge and
Schechter 2007) but it is not ecient enough to precisely identify cheaters.
3.4 Other Statistical Analyses of Survey Data
Inspection of concrete survey data also delivers encouraging results by revealing
\at risk" interviewers and falsications. Several forms of questions and ques-
tionnaires could be included in such an analysis.
As a result of our literature review we dierentiate between two kinds of
indicators which can be applied to an analysis to compare false and real data.
The rst kind applies to more or less plausible answers to survey questions by
falsiers, while the second kind is associated with the answering behaviour of
falsiers, which may dier from that of real respondents. We will call the rst
kind of indicators \content related" and the second "formal". Answers to open
numerical questions, which were analysed using Benfords Law (cf. Subsection
3.3), also belong to the formal criteria.
Content related indicators are special substantial answer patterns which sys-
tematically dier between fraudulent and accurate collected data. In the study
by Turner et al. (2002) falsiers produced implausible data regarding the com-
position of households (most households in falsied interviews included only
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one 18-45 year old adult). Furthermore, in this study target persons \inter-
viewed" by falsiers \reported" having remarkably more lifetime partners and
\showed" substantially more sexual activity, having sex much more often in the
past seven days than those who were really interviewed. Finally, falsiers pro-
vided phone numbers of \interviewed" persons less often. Further examples {
as found by Reuband (1990) { are dierences in evaluating one's own personal
nancial situation, which was estimated more optimistically by falsiers than
by real sampled persons. However, content related indexes have seldom been
used in studies to detect falsied data. Koch (1995) and Hood and Bushery
(1997) describe accordant analyses. Hood and Bushery (1997) used the provi-
sion of telephone numbers in combination with other indexes in their multiple
approach in order to improve reinterview samples. Schrapler and Wagner (2005)
compared data from dierent rounds of a panel study (SOEP) and identied
false data in this way. In other studies identied dierences between false and
real data are only discussed as possible cues to identify falsiers (Turner et al.
2002). Schnell (1991), who systematically analysed dierences between real and
falsied data and in particular found dierences in correlations and multiple
regressions, remains sceptical about the usage of obtained dierences for the
purpose of detection. Of course, applying content criteria, apart from questions
about household composition, age and gender, is problematic since it requires
asking sensitive questions (e.g. Turner et al. 2002) or questions about content
not related to the survey topic. Application of content related indicators needs
additional strong hypotheses and knowledge about the dierences between fal-
sied and real data, which are, as a rule, not available.
Formal criteria are produced by analysing the answering behaviour of in-
terviewed persons. An example is item non-response. As shown by Schrapler
and Wagner (2005) and Bredl et al. (2008) this occurs less often in falsied
than in real interviews, since falsiers incorrectly assume that real respondents
would answer all questions in an interview { and therefore they avoid item non-
response. In addition, Bredl et al. (2008) showed that falsiers dier from real
survey respondents in the way they answer semi-open-ended questions when the
category \others" was included. Falsiers tend to avoid the \others" category
in order to reduce the eort needed to formulate an open answer. In contrast,
when using open-ended questions one has to consider that falsiers should an-
swer such questions more frequently than real interviewees, but they should
tend to shorter answers. In addition, falsiers are less extreme if they use rating
scales for their answers. With the help of multivariate cluster analyses Bredl
et al. (2008) were able to separate falsiers from honest interviewers using (in
addition to Benfords Law, see section 3.3) information on item non-response,
extreme answers and answering of open and semi-open questions.
Furthermore, cheating interviewers can also be identied by looking at the
proportion of answers to questions that lead to a faster answering, and therefore
a quicker interview (cf. Matschinger et al. 2005; Hood and Bushery 1997). One
would suppose that falsiers tend to answer these so-called \lter questions"
in such a way that allows them to skip a part of the questionnaire \legally"
and therefore save time. For a health survey in the US Hood and Bushery
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(1997) reported that falsiers selected \the shortest path through the interview"
producing survey participants who live in one person families and are \white
non-smoker, no health problems and no health insurance" (p. 821). Using lter
questions in this way was one of the multiple indicators applied by Hood and
Bushery (1997) to detect falsiers.
In summary, formal criteria have advantages over content criteria in that
they can be used for dierent types of content in dierent surveys. Work by
Schrapler and Wagner (2005) and Bredl et al. (2008) shows that using formal
indicators is an encouraging approach. However, application of formal criteria
may increase the complexity of the answering process (e.g. by providing numer-
ous open and lter questions) and reduce the accuracy of respondent's answers
by promoting low motivation and supercial information processing (satiscing
behaviour, cp. Krosnick and Alwin (1987)). Like content related criteria, fal-
siers' answering behaviour should be known to the detectors. Furthermore it
is important to ensure that falsiers cannot adapt their way of cheating easily
if the criteria are known to them (e.g. if a falsier is aware that interview-
ers are considered to be suspicious if they deliver questionnaires with a low
prevalence of item non-responses he/she could simply increase the prevalence of
item non-responses when fabricating the data). This problem might be tackled
by combining several criteria which makes adaptation from the falsier's side
more dicult. Altogether, more research is needed in order to nd an optimal
questionnaire form, which can help to detect falsiers through statistical data
analysis using formal criteria.
3.5 Interviewer characteristics
In most of the studies presented above interviewer characteristics were discussed
as one issue which can be used for more focused reinterviews. The authors agree
that inexperienced interviewers are likely to show cheating behaviour and should
consequently be controlled by extended procedures (Biemer and Stokes 1989;
Wetzel 2003; Turner et al. 2002; Schreiner et al. 1988). Schreiner et al. (1988),
who report the results of the Interviewer Falsication Study of the U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census, discovered by data analysis of two national surveys that
the mean duration of employment for falsiers is signicantly lower (1:72 years)
than that of all interviewers (6:22 years). The authors recommended that \(...)
for the newer interviewers it may be useful to reinterview some of their work
more frequently" (Schreiner et al. 1988: p.496). Concerning other interviewer
characteristics mixed results can be found in the literature. With respect to
gender and age of interviewers Koch (1995) has shown that young interview-
ers with a higher level of education produce a higher rate of falsications. In
West-Germany Koch found no gender dierences, but in East-Germany male
interviewers fabricated interviews more often. However Schrapler and Wagner
(2003) did not discover any age, gender or education eects in SOEP.
As a result, interviewers' length of service seems to be a sucient cue for
more focused reinterviews. However, experienced interviewers are not less likely
to falsify, but are less likely to be detected by controls. Hood and Bushery
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(1997) reported the results of a study by the US Census Bureau 1982 which
analysed interviewers' characteristics and the likelihood of falsication. The re-
sults showed (similar to other studies) that interviewers' tenure in particular is
associated with dierences in falsication behaviour. But additionally the au-
thors reported that new interviewers with less than ve years of experience had a
higher probability of being detected, since they falsify more of their assignments
and they tend to falsify entire interviews. Experienced interviewers (with ve or
more years of experience) falsify a smaller proportion of their assignments and
prefer to falsify only a part of the interview. As a consequence, falsications by
experienced interviewers are more dicult to detect. Additionally, as shown by
Schreiner et al. (1988) experienced interviewers use more selective approaches
for falsication than less experienced interviewers. In panel surveys, for exam-
ple, experienced interviewers falsify more often in continuing households (and
not in newly selected households), since data can be appropriately estimated
from the previous round.
But in particular the comparison between experienced and inexperienced
interviewers is based on very small sample sizes of interviewers who were found
to falsify, and thus analyses were often done without statistical tests or results
were aicted by high statisitical insurance.
In summary, newly hired and relatively inexperienced interviewers are seen
as requiring extensive controls, but at the same time they are more amateur
falsiers who are more likely to be detected. This topic needs more research,
especially regarding methods which can help to identify partially fabricated in-
terviews conducted by experienced interviewers. Using length of service or other
demographic characteristics for generating focused interviews appears to be less
ecient in light of the results discussed in this section. This is particularly due
to the fact that extended controls of less experienced interviewers lead to lower
rates of falsication detection for experienced interviewers, who are much more
sophisticated falsiers.
4 Discussion and outlook
In spite of the scarcity of scientic publications related to detection of data fabri-
cation by interviewers, an examination of existing literature has delivered useful
insights. Below we attempt to deduce some recommendations for practitioners.
We have distinguished between two types of studies: ex-ante studies describe
approaches implemented to detect cheaters, whereas ex-post studies apply in-
dicators to datasets with known cases of falsication. Ex-ante studies analysed
in Section 2 clearly suggest that focused recontacts are more eective than re-
contacts based on random samples. Furthermore, examination of studies using
dierent recontact procedures reveals that the reinterview is the most reliable of
these procedures. Forwarding postcards is a questionable alternative as several
studies suggest that using postcards leaves many falsiers undetected. We thus
consider the focused reinterview as a good strategy to detect falsiers.
Ex-post studies complement ex-ante studies in that they provide deeper in-
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sights into the suitability of dierent methods when creating focused reinterview
samples. We have dened four methods in this context: metadata, Benford's
Law, other analyses of data contained in questionnaires referring to formal or
content-related information, and interviewer characteristics. These can be di-
vided into methods available for most surveys and methods whose applicability
is only possible for specic types of surveys.
Metadata, most types of formal survey data and data on interviewer char-
acteristics are available for a wide range of surveys. Approaches relying on
metadata and formal survey data have delivered promising results when used
to detect falsiers. This is especially true in the case of contact outcome data.
Analysis of answer patterns for lter questions seems to be another promising
approach and is directly linked to hypotheses of falsiers' behaviour. Interviewer
characteristics did not turn out to be a useful indicator for creating focused rein-
terview samples. However, literature reveals one important point: experienced
interviewers falsify in ways that make their detection more dicult. Thus, in-
dicators relying on metadata or survey data can be expected to deliver better
results for inexperienced interviewers who, if they falsify data, do it in a more
amateur way. Consequently, it is plausible to assume that focused reinterviews
are less ecient when applied to experienced interviewers.
The applicability of Benford's Law and of content related indicators based on
substantial answers by survey participants depends on the nature of the data col-
lected. Using Benford's Law requires a wide range of metric variables. Even if a
multitude of these variables is available it still remains open whether data which
is honestly collected can be supposed to conform to Benford's Law, and whether
fabricated data cannot. There have been some promising results, but Benford's
Law should be applied with caution and, if possible, in combination with other
indicators. General statements about the usefulness of content-related survey
data are dicult to make, as the type of data available depends on the type
of survey. It can be stated that answer patterns to questions on very sensitive
issues have turned out to be good predictors of interviewer cheating and should
thus be used to detect cheaters when available.
Whenever one employs indicators based on metadata or content-related sur-
vey data one has to keep in mind that striking indicator values are not neces-
sarily caused by data fabrication but may also be the result of \conventional"
interviewer eects or cluster related design eects (spatial homogeneity). If indi-
cators for the creation of focused reinterviews are calculated on the interviewer
level it is not possible to distinguish between data fabrication and interviewer
eects. Several studies which attempt to control for spatial homogeneity have
been discussed, however these approaches are not always replicable and they
bear the risk of omitting decisive factors. It is possible that indicators based
on formal survey data { for example the proportion of extreme answers or item
non-response { are less impaired by conventional interviewer eects and spatial
homogeneity. However, to the best of our knowledge no research has yet been
done on this issue.
In addition to the recommendations we have provided above, we would like
to point out some ideas for further research. First of all, more research should be
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done to broaden the discussed ndings with respect to the suitability of methods
we presented in Section 3. Of course there are several studies which focus on one
or more of these methods, but as we have shown in the context of Benford's Law
the results are sometimes inconclusive or are based on a sample which is too
small. Thus, further studies are needed to gain more reliable insights into how
every single detection method performs, as well as how combinations of these
methods perform. This means that we need to learn whether a combination of
detection methods performs better than the application of only one method.
In particular, the usage of survey data, and especially several content-related
and formal indicators, poses the problem of a trade-o between the complexity
of questionnaires and their usability on the part of respondents. Following our
recommendation that one should apply dierent detection methods, the ques-
tionnaire to be examined should provide a high proportion of suitable questions
to derive several indicators for the statistical analyses of survey data. In doing
so, the complexity of the questionnaire may increase and therefore the usability
for the interviewer, and of course for the respondent, diminishes and produces
further biases. Thus, one must keep in mind that the questionnaire overcharges
neither interviewers nor respondents.
Concerning the structure of survey data examined and regardless of the de-
tection method used, we noticed that in the majority of the studies presented,
analyses were conducted only on the interviewer level. Yet identication of
fraudulent survey data could also be realized on the interview level (cases in a
data set). Focusing on interviews bears the problem that the amount of data
per interview is less than the amount of data per interviewer, which probably
reduces discriminatory power. On the other hand, approaches focusing on inter-
viewers might struggle to detect falsiers who fabricate only a small proportion
of their interviews. Which strategy is preferable is another topic for future re-
search. Finally, it should be kept in mind that the methods discussed above
have all been tested and developed primarily to identify fabrications of entire
interviews. Further work concentrating mainly on the identication of partially
faked interviews is also needed.
The literature overview presented here shows that rst conclusions can be
drawn from existing comprehensive studies about interview falsications and
the prevailing detection methods. However, most of the approaches { especially
in the analysis of collected data { should be evaluated through further research
related to their eectiveness, and approaches should be developed to enable an
exact detection of falsications and falsiers.
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